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6Brazilian-German Trade and Finance: Complements and Caveats





Brazil is abundantly endowed in natural resources and land, whereas Germany is poor in the 
first and relatively poor in the second. Therefore, Brazilian exports of natural resources are 
welcome in Germany, which depends on importing raw materials from abroad.
Endowment: Labor Germany is relatively abundant in skilled labor and less so in unskilled labor. Hence, Germany 
holds a comparative advantage in producing goods and services that require advanced labor. 
Meanwhile, populous Brazil is working to improve its education system. Thus Brazil and Ger-
many are not competitors with respect to products that either require significant skilled labor 
or rely upon unskilled labor.
Endowment: Capital and 
current account balances
In order to enlarge the Brazilian capital stock, large investments are necessary. Brazil’s savings 
are not large enough to finance domestic investment. Germany has a high income level, high 
saving rate and current account surplus. Germany’s savings (and current account surplus) are 
therefore available to finance Brazil’s investment (and current account deficit).
Caveats
Context of trade policy Brazilian and German trade policies are firmly rooted in differences between the countries’ 
long-standing institutional structures and mind-sets. Brazil’s trade policy places a high pre-
mium on developing national industries and promoting the interests of developing countries. 
Germany’s economic policy is traditionally export-oriented and strongly intertwined with its 
European neighbors, to the degree that there is no independent German trade policy, only 
German interests that contribute to the formulation of the EU’s trade policy. These separate 
approaches can lead to differing trade strategies.
Agricultural products Brazil holds a comparative advantage in many agricultural products, which implies a 
disadvantage for German producers. German farmers, in turn, are being protected through 




Both countries have a strong interest in obtaining and maintaining high levels of employment. 
Increasing exports are a key instrument to satisfy this goal, especially for Germany. As a result, 
both countries pursue high exports and, consequently, current account surpluses. As all coun-
tries cannot simultaneously have current account surpluses, Germany’s surplus might sooner or 
later become an object of dispute.
Desired outcomes Although Brazil and Germany share the common aim to increase employment by foreign 
trade activities, they differ with respect to deeper desired outcomes of trade. In Brazil, fighting 
poverty, increasing the material prosperity of the population and importing technological 
knowledge are of greater importance than in Germany. In Germany, economic growth and full 
employment are the primary goals of trade.
Terms of trade and 
wealth
If the terms of trade of one country rise, that country receives a larger quantity of imported 
goods for a given bundle of exported goods. Therefore, an increase in the terms of trade of an 
economy has a positive impact on the wealth of the country. However, given the contrasting 
export portfolios, an improvement in Brazilian terms of trade would imply a reduction to 
German terms of trade (and vice versa). This represents an irresolvable trade-off.
Exchange rate policy The real depreciation of the domestic currency has a positive impact on the volume of a 
country’s exports. If, for example, Brazil tries to increase its exports by devaluing its currency, 
the result is a relative appreciation of Germany’s currency, which has a negative impact on 
German exports. As a result, there is another irresolvable trade-off if both countries try to incre-
ase exports by devaluing their currencies. However, as a member of the eurozone, Germany has 




bilateral	 trade	 and	 investment.	 In	 terms	 of	 comparative	 advantages,	 the	 Brazilian	 export	
portfolio	 tacks	heavily	towards	precisely	the	raw	materials	German	manufacturers	require—and	







To	 an	 extent,	 the	 statistics	 reflect	 the	 growing	 opportunities	 between	 the	 two.	 As	 this	 study	
demonstrates,	both	bilateral	trade	and	investment	have	increased	in	recent	years.	Nevertheless,	
the	 relationship	 has	 yet	 to	 reach	 its	 full	 potential.	 Politics	 and	 policies	 have	 curtailed	 trade	
expansion.	Brazil’s	membership	 in	 the	Mercosul	 trade	bloc	and	Germany’s	membership	 in	 the	
European	Union	have	hampered	the	pair’s	ability	to	forward	a	bilateral	trade	agreement,	as	each	
bloc	maintains	certain	defensive	positions	 that	 limit	 the	other	 from	exercising	 its	 comparative	

























This	 text	 represents	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 year-long	 collaboration	 between	 Bertelsmann	 Stiftung	




























Relations	between	Brazil	 and	Germany	are	not	 restricted	 to	 economic	 ties.	 For	more	 than	140	
years,	the	two	have	been	linked	by	active	bilateral	diplomatic	relations.	People	in	both	countries	
share	 important	 values,	 most	 notably	 for	 democracy	 and	 corresponding	 institutions.	 Bilateral	














Table 1: Estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2013, expressed in current 
prices
Region/Country GDP absolute in US$ (Billions) Share of the relevant region in percent
European Union (EU) 17.267 100.0 
Germany 3.593 20.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.774 100.0 
Brazil 2.190 37.9 





Table 2: Population, expressed in millions
Region/Country Population mid-2013 Share of the relevant region in percent
European Union (EU) 506.0 100.0 
Germany 80.6 15.9 
Latin America and the Caribbean 606.0 100.0 
Brazil 195.5 32.3 
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This	 chapter	 reviews	 the	drivers	 of	 trade	 for	Brazil	 and	Germany,	 as	well	 as	 the	opportunities	
inherent	in	the	pair’s	bilateral	trade	relationship.	Section 1	offers	a	brief	overview	of	Brazil	and	
















2. The Drivers of Trade
Drivers of Brazilian Foreign Trade 
Determining	Brazil’s	 factor	endowments	is	more	difficult	 than	in	its	region’s	 less	economically	
dynamic	countries,	such	as	Argentina	and	Chile,	because	of	Brazil’s	 large,	complex	portfolio	of	
imports	 and	 exports	 (Muriel	 and	 Terra,	 2009).	 Moreover,	 the	 country’s	 true	 abundances	 and	













In	 Brazil,	 the	 volume	 and	 structure	 of	 exports	 is	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 an	 abundance	 of	 raw	
resources,	 high	 commodity	 prices	 and	 strong	 global	 growth	 levels.	 Brazil	 is	 rich	 in	 mineral	
























within	 the	 earth	 for	want	 of	 railroads	 to	 transport	 the	 goods.	 Statistics	 support	 these	 anecdotes.	 The	 paper	 found	 the	 that	
Brazilian	infrastructure	investment	has	been	on	a	consistent	decline,	from	5.4	percent	of	GDP	in	the	1970s	down	to	2.1	percent	
in	the	2000s—only	slightly	above	the	estimated	2.0	percent	required	to	simply	maintain	the	existing	infrastructure	stock	(See	




Drivers of German Foreign Trade 
In	 Germany	 the	 volume	 and	 structure	 of	 exports	 and	 imports	 are	 mainly	 determined	 by	 an	
abundance	 of	 capital,	 a	well-trained	work	 force,	 favorable	 unit	 labor	 costs,	 a	 high	 standard	 of	
scientific	and	technical	knowledge,	supply-chain	integration	within	Europe	and	the	lack	of	natural	










Another	 driver	 of	 the	 volume	 and	 structure	 of	 German	 exports	 is	 the	 country’s	 high	 level	 of	
technology,	 which	 allows	 Germany	 to	 export	 high-tech	 products,	 knowledge	 and	 technology-










remained	 elevated	 for	more	 than	 a	 decade.	 Persistent	 high	 unemployment	 and	 the	 increasing	











Another	 driver	 of	German	 exports	 is	 its	membership	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 eurozone.	Germany’s	
central	 location	 in	 Europe	 and	 high	 degree	 of	 integration	with	 neighboring	 countries	 through	
the	common	European	market	has	led	to	strong	growth	in	intra-industry	trade	between	Germany	
and	 other	 European	 countries.	 German	 producers	 draw	 on	 asupply	 chain	 that	 includes	 firms	





countries	 of	 the	 eurozone	 would	 have	 been	 devalued	 by	 an	 average	 of	 nearly	 seven	 percent	
(Bertelsmann	 Stiftung,	 2013a).	 Such	 an	 increase	 in	 relative	 prices	would	 have	 had	 a	 negative	
impact	 on	German	exports.	At	 the	 same	 time,	German	 imports	would	have	 increased.	Being	a	







Figure 1: Labor costs per unit across countries and times (index: labor costs per 
unit in the base year 2000 = 100)
Source: OECD, calculations of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn.
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3. German and Brazilian Trade Policy
Brazilian Trade Policy
Brazilian	trade	policy	has	historically	been	protectionist,	dating	back	to	the	 import	substitution	
industrialization	 (ISI)	model	 of	 development	 employed	 during	 the	middle	 of	 the	 20th	 century.	
Since	the	market	 liberalization	of	 the	1980s,	Brazil	has	embarked	on	a	course	of	relative	trade	
openness,	 lowering	 tariffs	unilaterally	 and	pursuing	 regional	 trade	 integration	with	Argentina,	
Uruguay	and	Paraguay	via	Mercosul.	










not	 only	 of	 tariffs	 but	 also	 of	 non-tariff	 barriers,	 including	 complex	 import	 licensing	 schemes,	
import	fees	and	anti-dumping	duties,	which	increased	from	63	measures	in	2008	to	83	measures	
in	mid-2012	(WTO,	2009;	WTO,	2013).2	




















and	Technology	 (BMWi).	The	ministry	has	 fostered	a	number	of	 initiatives	 to	 improve	German	
competitiveness.4	The	German	Office	of	Economics	and	Export	Control	(BAFA)	supports	small	and	





the	supranational	European	Commission	 (EC)	and	European	Parliament	 (EP),	 that	 trade	policy	
involving	Germany	 (setting	 of	 tariffs	 or	 negotiation	 in	 the	WTO	 and	 other	 pacts,	 for	 example)	
can	be	created.	While	the	EU	considers	trade	liberalization	essential	to	further	economic	growth,	









The	 EU	Generalized	 System	 of	 Preferences	 (GSP)	 grants	 preferential	 access	 to	 the	 EU	market	
for	developing	countries.	The	EU	revised	the	GSP	in	2013	to	 focus	on	assisting	 least-developed	





markets;	 2)	 Exhausting	 all	 the	mechanisms	 available	 to	 trade	 policymakers,	 including	 a	marketing	 campaign	 for	 investing	







4. Overview of Brazilian-German Bilateral Trade
Brazilian-German	trade	has	consistently	 increased	over	the	past	decade,	 though	growth	slowed	







copper	 and	 crude	 oil	 (German	 Foreign	 Office,	 2012).	 While	 raw	 materials	 predominate,	 some	
















billion.	 Increases	 in	 Brazilian	 exports	 simply	 outpaced	 increases	 in	 Brazilian	 imports	 from	
Germany.	
5	 The	 Rotterdam	 effect	 refers	 to	 goods	 destined	 for	 a	 given	 country	 that	 enter	 the	 eurozone	 in	 third	 countries	 such	 as	 the	











Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Global Economic Dynamics




























































From	the	Brazilian	perspective,	exporting	 to	Germany	helps	Brazil	diversify	 its	 trade	portfolio.	







politically	 stable	 commodity	 producer	 such	 as	 Brazil	 can	 offer	 resource	 security	 for	 Germany.	
Meanwhile,	German	demand	for	Brazilian	commodities	not	only	expands	the	quantity	of	annual	
sales,	but	also	helps	bid	up	the	global	price—both	to	the	advantage	of	Brazil.







inputs	 and	 final	 goods.	Non-tariff	 and	 behind-the-border	 trade	 barriers	 feature	 prominently	 in	
most	of	the	disputes.	With	the	EU	still	struggling	to	recover	from	the	fallout	of	the	financial	and	
economic	crisis	 that	began	 in	2008,	 the	risk	of	protectionism	and	new	trade	disputes	remains	
high.	Experts	fear	that	as	the	Doha	Development	Agenda	negotiations	remain	in	a	stalemate,	the	
risk	of	 trade	dispute	settlement	 initiations	rises	as	well.	As	one	diplomat	put	 it,	 “The	 less	you	
negotiate,	the	more	you	litigate”	(Miles	2012).
In	the	current	Doha	round,	Brazil	and	the	EU	hold	opposing	views	on	many	crucial	issues.	Most	
importantly,	 they	disagree	on	 further	concessions	 for	agricultural	and	 industrial	products.	Due	
to	 the	 high	 competitiveness	 of	 its	 farmers,	 Brazil	 sees	 huge	 potential	 to	 increase	 the	 global	
Figure 3: Overview of trade drivers
For Germany For Brazil
Large growing market for German goods , Key trade diversification from USA & China
Brazilian development means increased trade opportu-
nities for German firms
, German expertise key for Brazilian infrastructure 
development
Maintain national resource security for manufacturing 
sector
, German commodity demand increases quantity/prices 
of Brazilian exports







the	 EU	 and	 the	US	 have	 offered	 cuts	 but	 they	 have	 been	 rather	 unrelenting	 about	 employing	
the	special	safeguard	measures	(SSM)	that	allow	for	the	temporary	use	of	import	restrictions	on	
certain	products	(for	example,	sugar)	in	case	of	a	sudden	surge	in	imports.
6. Towards a Mercosul-EU Free Trade Agreement?













Table 1: Brazilian–EU Trade Disputes before the WTO
No. Complainant Respondent Issue
DS69 Brazil EU EU tariff quota on frozen poultry
DS81 EU Brazil Brazilian measures regulating the import of cars and car parts 
DS116 EU Brazil New payment terms introduced by the Brazilian Central Bank
DS154 Brazil EU EU special preferential treatment for soluble coffee
DS183 EU Brazil Brazil’s import measurers for textiles
DS209 Brazil EU EU special preferential treatment for soluble coffee
DS219 Brazil EU EU anti-dumping duties on iron imports from Brazil
DS266 Brazil* EU EU subsidies for the sugar industry
DS269 Brazil** EU EU tariff reclassification of frozen poultry
DS332 EU Brazil Brazilian measures regulating the import of tires
DS409 Brazil EU EU seizure of generic drugs destined for Brazil
DS472 EU Brazil Brazilian taxation and charges on certain manufactured goods
* Together with Thailand and Australia.
** Together with Thailand.


























attempt,	 with	 no	 clear	 outcome	 but	 giving	 way	 to	 an	 extremely	 time	 and	 human	 resource-
consuming	process.	






















clear	 that	 their	 governments	 supported	 an	 agreement.	At	 a	 summit	meeting	 in	 January	 2013,	
German	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	won	the	commitment	of	Brazilian	President	Dilma	Rousseff	
and	 Argentine	 President	 Cristina	 Fernández	 de	 Kirchner	 to	 exchange	 concrete	 proposals	 for	
lowering	trade	barriers	by	the	end	of	2013	(Emmott,	2013),	something	Brussels	has	failed	to	do.
On	 February	 24,	 2014,	 Rousseff	 met	 with	 EU	 leaders	 to	 discuss	 negotiations	 (GMF,	 2014).	









FTA,	 claiming	 that	European	 farmers	will	 suffer	 extensive	 losses	 in	 the	 event	 of	 liberalization	






































of	Mercosul	 in	 1991,	 Brazil	 bet	 on	 its	 own	model	 of	 regional	 integration.	Mercosul	 has	 led	 to	





















This	 is	no	surprise,	 as	business	services	 tend	 to	be	closely	 linked	 to	 supply	chain	 integration.	
Germany	however,	is	also	relatively	poorly	integrated	in	global	services	trade,	as	many	important	










(a	more	 efficient	 source	 than	 corn	 or	 other	 plants)	 and	 related	 technologies	 such	 as	 flex-fuel	
engines	(that	run	on	gasoline,	ethanol	or	any	mixture	of	the	two)	and	electricity	from	the	biomass	
byproducts	 of	 sugarcane	 (rather	 than	being	net	 consumers	 of	 electricity,	Brazilian	 sugar	mills	
actually	supply	significant	amounts	to	the	grid).	Germany,	meanwhile,	has	been	a	leader	in	the	
development	 of	 solar	 panels	 and	wind	 turbines,	which	 are	 clearly	 an	 attractive	 energy	 option	
for	Brazil.	However,	 instead	 of	 benefiting	 from	each	 other’s	 strengths,	 each	 country	has	 taken	
a	protectionist	approach	towards	the	other’s	products,	with	costs	for	both	economies	as	well	as	
the	environment.	Given	that	Brazil	and	Germany	both	aspire	to	be	leaders	on	the	global	climate	
agenda,	greater	cooperation	 in	 this	area	should	be	a	political	priority.	 In	 the	20th	century,	 the	
two	countries	cooperated	in	the	development	of	nuclear	energy,	with	the	German	firm	Siemens	
supplying	 the	reactors	 for	Brazil’s	nuclear	plant	 in	Agra	dos	Reis.	Why	not	embark	on	similar	
cooperation	on	energy	sources	for	the	21st	century?	
26
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in	 light	 of	 recent	 Brazilian	 exchange	 rate	 volatility,	 and	 concludes	 by	 briefly	 considering	 the	
potential	benefits	of	macroeconomic	policy	harmonization.	
























Chapter II: Capital Flows and Investment
This	contention	is	supported	by	Caselli	and	Feyrer	(2007),	who	developed	a	methodology	to	correct	
the	marginal	product	of	capital	(MPC)	that	accounts	for	its	complementarities	with	human	capital	
and	natural	 resources.	 They	 find	 that	 although	 there	 are	 significant	 differentials	 in	 calculated	
MPC	between	rich	and	poor	countries	according	to	“naïve”	methodologies	(11.4	in	rich	countries	
against	 27.2	 in	 poor	 ones),	 corrections	 for	 the	 complementarities	 between	 capital	 and	 human	
capital	as	well	as	natural	resources	largely	equalizes	them	(8.4	for	rich	countries	against	6.9	for	
poor	countries),	suggesting	in	fact	that	rich	countries	may	have	a	somewhat	higher	MPC.




These	 include	conflicts	 (religious,	 ethnic)	and	pecuniary	and	non-pecuniary	costs	of	migration	
(legal	 restrictions,	 differences	 of	 cultural	 values,	 habits,	 loss	 of	 relations	 and	 network,	 lack	 of	
information	etc.).




Another	 factor	behind	 the	 relative	scarcity	of	capital	 in	poor	countries	 is	 the	 increased	risk	of	
investment.	 Papaionnau	 (2004,	 2009)	 examined	 the	 financial	 flow	 data	 from	 banks	 of	 140	
(industrial,	 emerging	 and	 underdeveloped)	 countries.	 His	 main	 finding	 was	 that	 institutional	
quality	is	a	key	correlate	to	foreign	bank	lending.	A	country	with	poorly	performing	institutions,	
including	weak	property	rights	and	high	risks	of	expropriation,	 legal	 inefficiency,	bureaucratic	

































Table 1: Number of defaults* during the 20th century, selected countries
Country Number of Defaults Episodes*
Ecuador, Uruguay and Liberia 6
Brazil and Peru 5
Venezuela, Austria and Yugoslavia 4
Mexico,Colombia, Argentina, Bulgaria, Russia and Poland 3
Germany, Chile and China 2
* Or debt restructuring
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
Table 2: Gross External Debt, Public Debt and GDP (2012)
Data Brazil Germany
Gross External Debt (as percent GDP) 19.6 168.2
Public Debt (as percent GDP) 58.8 81.9
GDP (US$ billion) 2252.7 3399.6
Source: World Bank, IMF and CIA.
30
Source: JP Morgan.
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2.  Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment from Abroad, in 
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Table 3: Direct Foreign Investment Position in Brazil, by country of origin, end of 2011
Rank Country US$ Billion
Total 688.6
1 Netherlands 171.2





7 United Kingdom 20.4
8 Mexico 17.1
9 Germany 16.7
10 Cayman Islands 16.5
Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
Table 4: Direct Foreign Investment Position of Germany in other countries, end of 
2011
Rank Country US$ Billion
Total 1,206.3
1 United States 221.5










Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
Table 5: Direct Foreign Investment Position in Germany, end of 2011




3 United States 91.4
4 France 83.4
5 Switzerland 79.1






Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
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Country 1. Stock of FDI in the country 
as percent of GDP
2. Stock of FDI of the country 
abroad as percent of GDP
1 + 2
1 United States 16.2 26.5 42.7
2 China 23.2 0.0 23.2
3 Japan 3.8 16.2 19.9
4 Germany 26.9 35.5 62.4
5 France 37.2 61.1 98.4
6 United Kingdom 43.7 70.8 114.5
7 Brazil 30.6 6.8 37.4
8 Russian Federation 22.6 18.0 40.6
9 Italy 16.9 25.8 42.7
10 India 9.7 3.3 13.0
11 Canada 32.2 36.3 68.5
12 Australia 33.9 22.6 56.5
13 Spain 43.8 44.9 88.7
14 Mexico 29.8 8.4 38.2
15 Korea, Rep. 11.8 15.2 27.0
16 Indonesia 21.2 0.0 21.2
17 Turkey 14.4 3.3 17.7
18 Netherlands 443.1 550.8 993.9
19 Switzerland 102.0 162.9 264.9
20 Sweden 64.7 67.2 131.9
OVERALL 28.3 32.1 
Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
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	 	The	 coefficient	 of	 correlation	 between	 the	measure	 of	 openness	 described	 in	 Table	 6	 (last	











	 	For	Germany,	 the	ratios	 for	each	hypothesis	would	be	slightly	smaller:	5.5	percent	and	6.9	
percent,	respectively.	Consequently,	there	is	not	much	difference	between	a	high-income-per-
capita	country	such	as	Germany	and	a	medium-income-per-capita	country	such	as	Brazil.	The	
overall	 figures	 (see	 the	 last	 line	of	Table	6)	 also	 suggest	 that,	making	similar	assumptions	
about	the	income/capital	ratio	for	all	the	20	countries,	the	percentage	of	the	stock	of	foreign	
direct	 investment	 to	 the	 total	 capital	 stock,	 for	 an	 average	 country	 of	 the	 group,	would	 be	
around	six	or	seven	percent.
3)	 	The	 stock	 of	 German	 direct	 investment	 in	 Brazil	 is	 1.4	 percent	 of	 the	 total	 German	 direct	
investment	abroad.	Through	the	years,	it	has	been	the	US—a	developed	country—that	has	been	



















Table 7: Distribution of the stock of foreign direct investment in Brazil, by country 











Source: Author’s Calculations based on CDIS/IMF Data
Table 8: Portfolio Investment Liabilities of Brazil to other countries, end of 2011
Rank Country US$ Billion
Total 497.1
1 United States 196.2
2 United Kingdom 106.0
3 Luxembourg 53.0
4 Japan 28.9







Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
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Table 9: Portfolio Investment Assets of Germany in other countries, end of 2011





4 United States 202.2






Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
Table 10: Stock of Foreign Direct and Portfolio Investment; Brazil and Germany 
as recipient and investor countries, end of 2011
Brazil Percent of GDP Germany Percent of GDP
Recipient Investor Recipient Investor
Foreign Direct Investment 30.6 6.8 26.9 35.5
Portfolio Investment 22.1 1.3 82.9 70.0
Source: CPIS/IMF and CDIS/IMF
36
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Chapter II: Capital Flows and Investment
International	financial	flows	are	the	crucial	transmission	mechanism	of	savings	among	countries.	







































Chapter II: Capital Flows and Investment
encouraging	 direct	 foreign	 investment.	 This	 would	 imply	 that	 a	 successful	 policy	 grants	 free	
exchange	convertibility	only	 to	 firms’	earnings	and	capital.	Banks,	 firms	and	common	citizens	
should	not	have	 the	ability	 to	 freely	withdraw	short-term	capital	 from	the	country	 in	whatever	
magnitude	they	like.	Neither	should	they	be	able	to	make	short-term	loans,	which	can	increase	
sharply	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 unsustainable	 asset	 price	movements	 and	 can	 reinforce	 economic	
instability.
The	 case	 of	 Brazil	 presents	 an	 illuminating	 example	 of	 instabilities	 related	 to	 capital	 inflows.	












from	 the	1990s,	when	Brazil	 faced	extremely	high	domestic	 rates	of	 inflation).	Figure	7	below	
shows	the	evolution	of	the	money	market	interest	rate	in	Brazil,	while	Figure	6	shows	the	end-of-
the-year	exchange	rates.
Figure 5: Portfolio Investment Liabilities of Brazil to other countries. Stock of 




















Chapter II: Capital Flows and Investment
The	 substantial	 appreciation	 of	 the	 real	 in	 this	 period	 caused	 problems	 for	 the	 export	 sector.	
Moreover,	 the	 average	Brazilian	 rate	 of	 inflation	 in	 the	 same	period	was	greater	 than	 the	 rate	
of	 inflation	of	Brazil’s	more	 important	 trading	partners.	Brazilian	 rates	of	 inflation	 reached	an	
average	of	 just	under	 six	percent	 in	2003–2013,	 consistently	 reaching	 the	ceiling	of	monetary	
policy	targets	and	far	surpassing	rates	in	trade	partner	countries	such	as	Germany	(1.82	percent	
in	that	period)	and	the	US	(2.40	percent).	Brazilian	industrial	exports	took	a	serious	hit	from	the	













































% per year Average of the period 
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In	 conclusion,	 allowing	 free	 international	 capital	 flows	 set	 a	 chain	 of	 events	 in	motion	which,	
paradoxically,	 led	 to	 a	 decrease	 of	 investment	 and	 of	 the	 productive	 capacity	 growth	 of	 the	
Brazilian	 economy.	 Speculative	 capital	 flows	 have	 been	 particularly	 problematic	 for	 Brazilian	
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Chapter III: Recommendations 
German-Brazilian	 economic	 relations	may	 be	 growing,	 but	 they	 remain	 far	 from	 their	 overall	
potential.	In	some	cases,	differing	policy	approaches	prevent	both	countries	from	fully	exercising	
their	 comparative	 advantages	 or	 engaging	 in	 mutually	 beneficial	 exchanges.	 In	 other	 cases,	
membership	in	political	and	economic	blocs	constrains	both	countries’	abilities	to	expand	their	
economic	relations	where	it	is	in	the	national	interest.	
Given	 the	 deep-seated	 and	 often	 political	 nature	 of	 these	 obstacles,	 concrete	 and	 actionable	
recommendations	 can	 be	 elusive.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 paper	 indicates	 that	 there	 is	 significant	
common	ground	shared	between	Brazil	and	Germany,	and	there	are	concrete	recommendations	
that	can	help	both	countries	build	upon	this	common	ground.	







harmonizing	monetary	 policy,	 3)facilitating	migration	 as	 a	 mechanism	 for	 spurring	 economic	
links,	4)finding	common	ground	on	trade	policy,	and	5)encouraging	Brazil	and	Germany	to	assume	
leadership	roles	in	advancing	an	EU-Mercosul	FTA.	
1. Prioritizing Bilateral Direct Investment
While	a	firm	consensus	can	be	hard	to	find	on	whether	open	capital	flows	benefit	a	given	economy,	
there	 is	 greater	 room	 for	 agreement	 on	FDI.	Moreover,	 in	 contrast	 to	 liberalizing	 trade,	which	























as	 the	 Brazilian	 development	 bank	 (Banco	 Nacional	 do	 Desenvolvimento	 Econômico	 e	 Social,	







percentage	 of	GDP)	 significantly	 lags	 that	 of	 other	 countries	 including	 the	US	and	Spain.	 The	
German-Brazilian	Business	Day,	organized	annually	by	the	Federation	of	German	Industries	(BDI)	
and	 its	Brazilian	counterpart,	 the	National	Confederation	of	 Industry	 (CNI),	could	be	expanded	
into	 a	 broader	 conference	 bringing	 together	 the	 business	 community	 with	 policymakers	 and	
academics.	











relatively	 large.	 Hence	 the	 demand	 for	 domestic	 investment	 is	 comparatively	 small.	 Surplus	
revenue	from	foreign	trade	 is	spent	on	 investment	abroad	rather	 than	on	currency	reserves	or	
domestic	investments.	Therefore,	Germany	supports	very	open	FDI	and	portfolio	investment	policy.
Brazil,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 suffered	 exchange	 rate	 volatility	 in	 recent	 years	 that	 has	 gone	




US	 monetary	 policy	 is	 made	 exclusively	 with	 US	 economic	 interests	 in	 mind,	 it	 has	 global	
implications	because	 the	dollar	 is	effectively	a	global	currency.	For	similar	 reasons,	Brazil	and	






or	URR).	 The	 encaje	was	modified	 a	number	 of	 times	 as	policymakers	 sought	 to	 establish	 the	
correct	balance.	Alternatively,	foreign	investors	could	pay	an	upfront	fee	to	the	central	bank	and	
avoid	 the	URR.	Studies	have	 suggested	 that	 the	 encaje	 succeeded	 in	 changing	 the	maturity	 of	




While	some	restrictions	on	 the	 flow	of	“hot	money”	 (short-term	portfolio	 investment)	might	be	
warranted	in	Brazil,	direct	investment	should	be	welcomed.	Brazil	has	been	quite	successful	at	



















and	may	necessitate	bringing	along	a	more	significant	 labor	 force.	 In	addition,	migration	rules	
play	an	important	rule	for	tradable	services,	especially	terms	of	temporary	movement	of	persons.	













exchange	programs.	Brazil	 remains	an	exotic	and	poorly	understood	destination	 in	 the	eyes	of	
many	Germans,	 and	 the	 same	 is	 true	 for	Germany	 as	 seen	 by	Brazilians.	As	 a	 result,	 foreign	
investment	projects	between	the	two	can	seem	daunting.	However,	stemming	from	the	German	
ethnic	 origins	 of	 a	 sizable	 portion	 of	 Brazil’s	 population,	 the	 southern	Brazilian	 states	 (where	
people	of	German	descent	are	concentrated)	have	interesting	relations	with	several	segments	of	
German	society,	 including	 twin	and	 sister	 cities	 agreements,	 cross-collaborations	among	small	
and	medium	enterprises,	technology	exchanges	between	scientific	and	industrial	research	centers,	
and	art	and	cultural	festivals.	We	believe	that	an	expansion	of	such	cross-cultural	programs,	such	




4. Finding Common Ground on Trade Policy
Our	 first	 recommendations	 focus	 on	 FDI	 because	 we	 believe	 these	 will	 be	 easier	 to	 achieve.	
However,	 given	 the	 complementary	 export	 portfolios	 and	 potential	 for	 mutually	 beneficial	
integration	 between	 the	 two	 countries,	 neither	 should	 shy	 away	 from	 the	 difficult	 dialogues	
required	to	deepen	trade	in	goods	and	services.





The	 European	 Union	 consistently	 maintains	 high	 taxes	 and	 non-tariff	 barriers	 on	 agricultural	
products,	which	play	an	important	role	for	Brazilian	exports.	Germany	should	plead	for	a	reduction	
of	such	barriers	at	the	European	level.	Furthermore,	Germany	could	push	for	changes	in	the	EU’s	
Common	Agricultural	 Policy	 to	 reduce—or	 even	 abolish—subsidies	 for	 agriculture;	 a	 distortion	 of	
competition	at	the	expense	of	developing	and	emerging	countries	such	as	Brazil.	In	exchange,	Brazil	
should	reduce	its	taxes	on	final	industrial	goods.	Such	measures	would	be	beneficial	for	both	sides.
A	 liberalization	 of	 trade	 flows	 should	 also	 facilitate	 the	 establishment	 of	 international	 supply	
chains	linking	industries	in	Germany	and	Brazil.	Given	that	both	countries	are	the	most	prominent	
manufacturing	 hubs	 in	 their	 respective	 regions,	 there	 should	 be	 significant	 gains	made	 from	
supply	chain	integration.	
Another	aspect	 is	 that	contemporary	ways	of	production	and	consumption	are	not	sustainable,	
especially	 due	 to	 the	 implied	 huge	 demand	 for	 natural	 resources	 and	 the	 volume	 of	 harmful	




















of	 two	 countries	 to	 each	 other	 is	 emphasized,	 among	 other	 things,	 by	 visits	 of	 high-ranking	
politicians.	 Since	 taking	 office	 in	 November	 2005,	 German	 Chancellor	 Angela	 Merkel	 visited	
China	six	times.	During	that	same	period,	she	visited	Brazil	just	once,	in	May	2008.





macroeconomic	 turbulence.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 EU	 maintains	 agricultural	 subsidies	 that	 could	
prevent	Mercosul	countries	from	leveraging	their	comparative	advantages,	thus	disincentivizing	
cooperation.	
Yet	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 exists.	 Uruguay	 and	 Paraguay	 have	 joined	 Brazil	 in	 expressing	




(both	 in	 terms	of	population	and	GDP),	Brazil	 and	Germany	are	particularly	well	positioned	 to	
assume	this	leadership	role.
While	 trade	 with	 Brazil	 is	 currently	 less	 important	 for	 Germany,	 it	 presents	 an	 important	















in	 order	 to	 entice	 the	 South	American	 bloc	 to	 join	 in	 the	 agreement.	Germany	 should	 use	 its	
bargaining	power	within	the	EU	in	order	to	push	for	the	dismantling	of	outstanding	trade	barriers.
At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 important	multilateral	 initiatives	 should	 not	 constrain	 the	 expansion	
of	bilateral	relations.	 In	services	sectors	as	well	as	 in	manufacturing,	 there	is	a	wide	scope	for	
partnerships	and	preferential	trade	facilitation	measures,	within	WTO	rules,	that	can	significantly	




Moving Forward: Finding the Common Ground
Moving Forward: Finding the Common Ground
All	of	these	recommendations	imply	that	there	is	common	ground	between	Brazil	and	Germany	
in	 terms	 of	 economic	 strategies,	 strengths	 and	 policies.	 By	 finding	 this	 common	 ground,	 the	
burgeoning	relationship	between	the	two	can	continue	to	grow.	
As	this	“common	ground	process”	advances,	coordinated	on	multiple	levels	(among	governments,	
institutions	 and	 investors),	 the	 conversation	 on	 trade,	 technology	 and	 other	 significant	 policy	
topics	might	become	 increasingly	more	 feasible,	and	 further	mutually	beneficial	arrangements	
may	be	discovered.
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About the Project “Global Economic Dynamics” (GED)
The	 Bertelsmann	 Stiftung	 established	 the	 project	 “Global	 Economic	 Dynamics”	 (GED)	 to	 shed	
more	light	on	the	growing	complexity	of	international	economic	relationships.	By	using	state-of-
the-art	 tools	and	methods	for	measuring,	 forecasting	and	displaying	the	dynamics	of	 the	world	
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